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Protecting California’s Farmworkers 
During the Wildlife Crisis: The State’s 
Response and the Need for Reform 
MARIA SALINAS* 
ABSTRACT 
Wildfires are a normal part of California’s drought-prone landscape, 
but in recent years, blazes have become more deadly and destructive than 
ever before due to climate change, low precipitation, and forest 
mismanagement.1  To date, the wildfires in 2020 remain some of the worst in 
the state’s history in terms of acreage lost, loss of life, and structures 
destroyed.2  Experts suggest that “without greater investment in prevention 
and systematic changes to combat the effects of climate change. . . California 
almost certainly has more record-setting fire seasons in store.”3 
This is a very grim reality for all Californians, but particularly for those 
whose entire livelihood rests on outdoor labor, such as farmworkers.  During 
the peak of the wildfires in 2020, air districts like the Bay Area Air Quality 
Management District urged people to stay indoors to reduce the risk of 
inhaling toxic particulate matter,4 but farmworkers did not have this option. 
 
 * Juris Doctor Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
1. Priya Krishnakumar and Swetha Kannan, The Worst Fire Season Ever. Again, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/projects/california-fires-damage-climate-change-
analysis/.   
2. Stats and Events, CAL FIRE, https://www.fire.ca.gov/stats-events/ (explaining that in 2021, 
there have been 8,367 fires reported, which is more than the 8,258 wildfires reported in 2020.  
However, in terms of acres destroyed, the 2020 wildfires destroyed 4,332,960 acres, as opposed to 
3,083,507 acres in 2021); Julie Cart, California’s 2020 fire siege: wildfires by the numbers, 
CALMATTERS (July 30, 2021), https://calmatters.org/environment/2021/07/california-fires-2020/; 
2019 Calfornia Wildfires, CTR. FOR DISASTER PHILANTROPY (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disaster/2019-california-wildfires/. 
3. Krishnakumar and Kannan, supra note 1. 
4. Joseph Serna, et al., Bay Area has the world’s worst air quality thanks to this week’s 
Northern California fires, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-20/air-quality-danger-san-francisco-wildfire-
smoke-ash. 
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They continued working under hazardous air conditions, inhaling toxins that 
pose devastating, long-term health effects.5 
Recognizing the severity of the situation, California’s Department of 
Industrial Relations issued a proposed emergency action in 2019.6  The 
action required employers who conduct their businesses outdoors to issue an 
N95 particulate respirator when the air quality index (AQI) reached 151 for 
voluntary use by workers.7  But, from its inception, the action was replete 
with problems and was unenforceable.  The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) simply did not have the capacity to do site 
inspections to ensure compliance, and employers did not always provide the 
N95 masks in the first place. 
In this investigation, I argue that despite its many shortcomings, the 
emergency regulation should be made permanent, at least until our 
legislators come up with a better solution to protect farmworkers.  I further 
argue that alternative approaches are better suited to help us address the 
problem.  These include changing industry norms, implementing hazard pay 
provisions on a local level, encouraging employers to be proactive about 
securing N95 masks, looking to other states that also face inclement weather 
conditions in the workplace for guidance, and increasing the presence of 
advocacy organizations. 
Part I begins with a threefold background section.  First, I explore the 
multi-billion dollar agribusiness model that exists in California and why it is 
so lucrative.  Then, I address the harsh realities that farmworkers in the State 
face, and the lack of legal and social protections currently available to them.  
Lastly, I look at why wildfires are commonplace in California, and how a 
host of factors has made them much more deadly in recent years.  In Part II, 
I focus on the factors that pushed farmworkers to continue working during 
the 2019 and 2020 wildfire seasons, despite hazardous air conditions.  Some 
of the factors discussed include financial hardships, inability to qualify for 
unemployment insurance, and mounting pressure from farmers to pick the 
crops before they were ruined by the fires and ash. 
In Part III, I explore the mobilizing efforts undertaken by three advocacy 
organizations that were instrumental in petitioning the State to adopt an 
emergency regulation that would protect outdoor workers.  Next, I turn to the 
State’s temporary emergency regulation and analyze its major components. 
Part IV then explores some of the major criticisms of the regulation, namely 
 
5. Molly Peterson, State Regulators Move to Protect Workers From Wildfire Smoke, KQED 
(July 18, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/science/1945176/state-regulators-move-to-protect-workers-
from-wildfire-smoke. 
6. STATE OF CAL., DEP’T. OF INDUS. RELS., NOTICE OF PROPOSED EMERGENCY ACTION BY 
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH  STANDARDS BOARD REGARDING PROPOSED CHANGES 
TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, TITLE 8, NEW SECTION 5141.1 PROTECTION FROM 
WILDFIRE SMOKE (2019), https://www.dir.ca.gov/oshsb/documents/noticeJul2019-Protection-
from-Wildfire-Smoke-Emergency.pdf [hereinafter PROPOSED EMERGENCY ACTION]. 
7. Id. at 7. 
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that it is unenforceable and that it does very little to actually protect 
farmworkers from the risks posed by wildfires. 
Part V explores policy recommendations that can help us approach the 
situation from a different angle.  I argue that local hazard pay provisions, 
encouraging employers to stockpile N95 masks for future use, greater 
presence of advocacy organizations, and adopting new value systems in 
agriculture can better help us to ensure the safety of our farmworkers.
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Agribusiness in California 
According to the California Employment Development Department, 
“the agricultural sector is one of the largest industry sectors in California, and 
its performance is vital to the economic health of the state.”8  California’s 
agricultural sector is not just vital on a local level, it is also vital on a national 
and global scale,9 and has been praised as the most productive and innovative, 
often known as the “salad bowl capital of the world”.10  In fiscal year 2019-
2020, California’s agricultural exports totaled $21.7 billion, representing 16 
percent of total U.S. agricultural exports,11 which is an impressive feat for 
any one state.  To put California’s exporting capacity into perspective, 
“California has remained the top export earnings State since 2000, with Iowa, 
Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Texas near the top of the list in any given 
year.”12 
 California’s agricultural success can be partially attributed to the 
diversity of its land and climate.13  Roughly speaking, the State is divided 
into seven production regions: the San Joaquin Valley, the Sacramento 
Valley, the Central Coast, the South Coast, the Desert, the Mountain region, 
and the North Coast.14  Out of these seven production regions, the San 
 
8. Agricultural Employment in California, STATE OF CAL., EMP. DEV. DEP’T,  
https://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/data/ca-agriculture.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2021). 
9. CAL. RURAL POL’Y TASK FORCE, GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF PLAN. & RES., CALIFORNIA 
AGRICULTURE: FEEDING THE FUTURE, at 2 (2003), 
https://rural.legislature.ca.gov/sites/rural.legislature.ca.gov/files/OPR_report.pdf. 
10. Assembly Agriculture Committee Hearing on Wildfire Impacts, CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY 
MEDIA ARCHIVES, at 25:05 (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.assembly.ca.gov/media/assembly-
agriculture-committee-20201118/video (statement of Rep. Robert Rivas). 
11. CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 2019-2020, at 1 (2020), 
https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/Statistics/PDFs/2020_Exports_Publication.pdf (explaining that the top ten 
exporting destinations included the European Union, Canada, China/Hong Kong, Japan, South 
Korea, Mexico, India, United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, and Turkey). 
12. Annual State Agricultural Exports Interactive Chart, USDA (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/state-agricultural-trade-data/annual-state-agricultural-
exports/. 
13. See CAL. RURAL POL’Y TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 7. 
14. U.C. DAVIS AGRIC. ISSUES CTR., THE MEASURE OF CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE: COUNTY 
LEVEL PRODUCTION, ch. III.4 at 68 (2000) https://aic.ucdavis.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/2000-moca-III.4.pdf (explaining that aside from the productive San 
Joaquin Valley, the other regions all have their niche commodities.  For example, the Sacramento 
Valley is known for its horticultural and field crops, particularly processed tomatoes and rice.  The 
Central Coast is a major horticultural producer, as it includes the state’s top wine grape and 
vegetable growing areas.  The South Coast also grows a number of horticultural crops, including 
citrus, and is a major producer of nursery and floriculture products.  The Desert region produces 
winter vegetables, field crops, and horticultural specialties such as dates.  The Mountain and North 
Coast regions hold California’s vast forest and rangeland resources.  All of these regions contain 
some urban influence, but the coastal regions contain California’s major population centers). 
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Joaquin Valley is the leading production area in the State as it pertains to 
fruit, vegetables, livestock, tree nuts, and dairy products.15  The San Joaquin 
Valley employs a significant percentage of the state’s farmworkers.16 
B. The Perilous Work Conditions for Farmworkers 
While land and climate diversity contributes to the state’s agricultural 
success, it is equally important to recognize the hardworking men and women 
who care to and tend the land as a critical part of that success story.17  Ninety-
two percent of California’s agricultural workers are Latinx, and the 
remaining 8 percent include White, Asian American, and African American 
workers.18  Farmworkers are disproportionately male at seventy-seven 
percent, and most are between the ages of 25 and 44.19 
Unfortunately, farmworkers are often undervalued and unappreciated, 
so their “lived realities stand in stark contrast” to the highly profitable 
agribusinesses in the State.20  Since its inception, California’s agribusiness 
has employed various mechanisms to ensure that farmworkers remain 
marginalized, including state intervention in labor relations through 
immigration and labor policy, creation of a racialized agricultural workforce 
that is denied livable wages, and continued replacement of existing workers 
with new (and cheaper) immigrant labor.21 
Scholars argue that farmworkers exist in a “legal culture of agricultural 
exceptionalism” because they are “held captive to irregular employment, 
impoverishment, and inadequate and unsafe housing with attendant health 
consequences.”22  On a national scale, for example, farmworkers have been 
 
15. Id. 
16. California Agricultural Employment 2019 Annual Average, ST. OF CAL. EMP. DEV. DEP’T 
(June 2021), https://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/file/agric/ca-ag-employ-map-2019.pdf. 
17. CAL. AGRIC. LAB. REL. BD., THE CALIFORNIA FARM LABOR FORCE: OVERVIEW AND 
TRENDS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY, at 8 (2005) 
https://www.alrb.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/196/2018/05/CalifFarmLaborForceNAWS.pdf 
(explaining that approximately thirty six percent of the nation’s farmworkers are employed in 
California, many of them from Mexico. There are a lot of workers from Central America as well, 
but I couldn’t find reliable statistics that detailed the percentage).   





20. Sandy Brown & Christy Getz, Farmworker Food Insecurity and the Production of Hunger 
in California, CULTIVATING FOOD JUSTICE: RACE, CLASS, AND SUSTAINABILITY 121, 124 (Alison 
Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman eds., 2011). 
21. Id. at 124-25. 
22. Guadalupe T. Luna, The Dominion of Agricultural Sustainability: Invisible Farm 
Laborers, WISC. L. REV. 265, 274 (2014). 
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historically excluded from key federal labor law legislation.23  California has 
attempted to fill in the legal gaps stemming from federal exclusionary 
policies by enacting its own legislation, such as the Agricultural Labor 
Relations Act of 1975, which aims to protect the right of agricultural 
employees to full freedom of association and self-organization.24  Despite the 
supplementary protections at the state level, however, conditions for 
farmworkers in California remain virtually unchanged since the 1970s.25  
California’s farmworkers “continue to experience the same low literacy 
levels, poverty, poor working and housing conditions, dependency on labor 
contractors for work, undocumented status, and language isolation that limit 
accessibility.26  As a result of all of these factors, California’s farmworkers 
are often treated as cheap, disposable labor—so it is not surprising that they 
were forced to continue working during the State’s deadly wildfire seasons. 
C. Recurring Wildfires 
California is a dry and drought-prone state, making wildfires a natural 
occurrence.  But in recent years, the wildfires have become exponentially 
more destructive and devastating.27  According to Nick Schuler, the acting 
Deputy Director of Communications for the Department of Forestry, the 
2020 wildfires were the most destructive ever recorded in the State’s modern 
history.28  By the end of 2020, nearly 10,000 fires had burned through the 
State, destroying over 4.2 million acres.29  Several factors contributed to the 
wildfires, including climate change, nature, factors such as unusual lightining 
 
23. U.S. Labor Law for Farmworkers, FARMWORKER JUST., 
https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/advocacy_program/us-labor-law-for-farmworkers/ (explaining 
that until 1966, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) excluded farmworkers.  The FLSA now 
applies the minimum wage and recordkeeping provisions, but the overtime pay provisions of the act 
are still not applicable to farmworkers.  The FLSA also offers far fewer child labor protections to 
agricultural workers than to all other workers) (last visited Sept. 29, 2021). 
24. 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th), Agency § 713. 
25. See Brief of Amici Curiae Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., Cal. Rural Legal Assistance 
Found., Farmworker Just., And Cal. Cath. Conf. in Support of Respondents at 9, Cedar Point 
Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (No. 20-107) [hereinafter Brief] (supporting the State 
regulation affording union organizers a limited right to access property on which agricultural 
employees are working). 
26. Id. 
27. Maanvi Singh, California’s wildfire smoke could be more harmful than vehicle emissions, 
study says, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2021/mar/06/california-wildfire-smoke-harmful-pollution-
study?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other. 
28. See CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY MEDIA ARCHIVES, supra note 10, at 34:20 (statement of CAL 
FIRE Chief Acting Deputy Director for Communications Nick Shuler). 
29. 2020 Fire Season, CAL FIRE,  
https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2020/#:~:text=As%20of%20the%20end%20of,gigafire%22%20
as%20the%20area%20burned (last visited Sept. 29, 2021). 
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strikes, human contribution, fire mismanagement, and wind.30  Moreover, 
2020 was an especially hard-hit year: the State relies heavily on prison inmate 
labor to battle fires, but fewer individuals were on the front lines due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.31 
The impacts caused by the deadly blazes were impossible to escape, and 
even Californians who were fortunate enough to be out of the fires’ 
immediate vicinity nonetheless experienced the effects of poor air quality.32  
For example, in the fall of 2020, the Bay Area made headlines for “having 
the world’s worst air quality.”33  Because the wildfires burned through 
infrastructures and homes, the resulting smoke was replete with toxic 
particles from chemicals, household cleaners, metals, and other debris.34  In 
addition to air toxicity, the size of the particulate matter in the air was also 
very concerning.35  Fine particulate matter, known as PM2.5, consists of 
particles that are 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter.36  These particles were 
of huge concern for public health because they are so small and, when 
inhaled, enter the lungs, heart, and bloodstream.37  PM2.5 inhalation can 
trigger a host of health issues, including eye irritation, coughing, wheezing, 
bronchitis, other respiratory problems, and even death.38 
Wildfires won’t be going away any time soon, and are likely to intensify 
as a result of climate change.39  Nonetheless, some experts are optimistic that 
focus and deliberate action will help us to better coexist with wildfires.  They 
suggest that “identifying and mapping hazard areas, investing in forest health 
projects, creating green belts around communities, ensuring communities 
have proper evacuation routes, building homes out of burn-resistant amber, 
and public education” are key proactive measures that can be undertaken now 
to ensure that fires become more manageable in the future.40 
 
30. Kendra Pierre-Lois and John Schwartz, Why Does California Have so Many Wildfires?, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/why-does-california-have-
wildfires.html?. 
31. Thomas Fuller, Coronavirus Limits California’s Efforts to Fight Fires with Prison Labor, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/22/us/california-wildfires-
prisoners.html (explaining that the COVID 19 pandemic highlighted the state’s problematic 
dependence of exploiting inmates to battle the state’s seasonal wildfires). 
32. See CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY MEDIA ARCHIVES, supra note 10, at 36:30 (statement of CAL 
FIRE Chief Acting Deputy Director for Communications Nick Shuler). 
33. See Serna, supra note 4. 
34. See Singh, supra note 27. 
35. California Air Resources Board et al., Wildfire Smoke: A Guide for Public Health Officials 




38. See Serna, supra note 4. 
39. See CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY MEDIA ARCHIVES, supra note 10, at 38:48 (statement of CAL 
FIRE Chief Acting Deputy Director for Communications Nick Shuler). 
40. Id. at 39:12. 
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II. FARMWORKERS CONTINUED WORKING, 
DESPITE THE HAZARDOUS AIR QUALITY 
The 2020 wildfires in California were the deadliest and most destructive 
in the state’s history, yet farmworkers continued working in these hazardous 
conditions.  Several factors can account for this grim reality: farmworkers 
needed to make ends meet, employers had an urgent need to have their crops 
picked, and the State had few safety nets available for farmworkers. 
A. Farmers Continued Working Simply to Make Ends Meet 
For the most part, farmworkers continued working during the 2019 and 
2020 wildfire seasons, despite detrimental health risks, out of economic 
necessity.  A common sentiment among farmworkers was that “it’s difficult 
to think about the long-term effects of the fires on one’s health, when you’re 
just trying to figure out next week.”41  Farmworkers often face financial 
hardships stemming from unlivable wages and exploitation by agribusiness.42  
“The great irony” of the agricultural industry in California is that many 
farmworkers, who spend their days harvesting our food, are food insecure 
themselves.43  Thus, farmworkers had no alternative—having a job working 
through the wildfires is better than not having one at all. 
In a phone interview, Horacio Amezquita, manager at San Jerardo 
Cooperative in Salinas providing housing for low-income farmworkers and 
their families, mentioned that during the height of the wildfires in 2020, he 
noticed no significant pause or disruption in work.44  Mr. Amezquita 
observed that those who do not typically work, such as children, stayed 
indoors when the air was particularly smoky, but farmworkers were in the 
fields every single day no matter the conditions, and he saw no other 
structural changes to the work day.45  Further, Mr. Amezquita relayed that 
San Jerardo residents who continued working in the fields during the 
wildfires mentioned that they “felt fatigued, didn’t have any energy,” and 
 
41. Erika Mahoney, Farm Workers Face Double Threat: Wildfire Smoke and COVID-19, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 7, 2020) https://www.npr.org/2020/09/07/909314223/farm-workers-
face-double-threat-wildfire-smoke-and-covid-19. 
42. Id. 
43. See Brown & Getz, supra note 20, at 121. 
44. Telephone Interview with Horacio Amezquita, Gen. Manager, San Jerardo Coop., Inc. 
(Apr. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Amezquita Interview]. Mr. Amezquita is the manager at San Jerardo Co-
Op in Salinas, a housing cooperative that provides affordable housing to farmworkers and their 
families.  According to Mr. Amezquita, the co-op houses approximately 250 workers, and 100 
children.  Mr. Amezquita has been living there since 1979 and is one of the founding members.  Mr. 
Amezquita is well connected with the residents, so he provided me with very interesting 
observations he made during the wildfires, as well as anecdotal evidence from conversations he had 
with the residents. 
45. Id. 
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generally felt very tired.46  One worker in particular worked during the 
wildfires, then caught COVID-19 and fell into a coma.47  This “double threat” 
of wildfire smoke and the rampant COVID-19 virus was commonplace for 
hundreds of farmworkers in Monterrey County, and is a testament to their 
work ethic as they endured “one hardship after another.”48 
B. Farmworkers were Ineligible for Unemployment Insurance 
Weak government response in light of the wildfires further pushed 
farmworkers to labor under hazardous air conditions.  On August 18, 2020, 
California Governor Gavin Newsom proclaimed a state of emergency as a 
result of the wildfires.49  In that declaration, Governor Newsom suspended 
provisions of Unemployment Ins. Code §1253, which imposes a one-week 
waiting period for unemployment insurance applicants who applied between 
August 14, 2020 and February 12, 2021 and were otherwise eligible for 
unemployment insurance.50  Unfortunately, farmworkers did not benefit from 
the suspension of this provision because they do not qualify, as detailed 
below. 
In an interview with Nicole Marquez, an attorney at the National 
Employment Law Project, Ms. Marquez mentioned that farmworkers were 
thrust into work because they did not qualify for unemployment benefits.51  
To file a claim for unemployment, a worker must 1) be unemployed, 2) 
through no fault of their own, 3) be physically able to work, and 4) be ready 
and willing to accept work immediately.52  Most farmworkers did not qualify 
because they were employed, and if they decided to stay home because of the 
unhealthy air quality, they wouldn’t satisfy the “ready and willing to accept 
work” or “through no fault of their own” prongs of the test.  As a result, 
farmworkers had no choice but to keep working. 
C. Farmers Needed to Salvage their Crops 
On the other hand, farmworkers were made to work because the crops 




48. See Mahoney, supra note 41. 




51. Telephone Interview with Nicole Marquez, Dir. of Soc. Ins., Nat’l Emp. Law Project (Apr. 
10, 2021) [hereinafter Marquez Interview].  In her previous role at Worksafe, a labor advocacy 
organization, Ms. Marquez, along with several other attorneys, were pioneers in petitioning the State 
to pass the emergency regulation. 
52. Requirements to File an Unemployment Claim, STATE OF CAL. EMP. DEV. DEP’T, 
https://edd.ca.gov/Unemployment/Eligibility.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2021). 
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pick and save their crops before the fires, smoke, and heat damaged them.53  
For example, in the North Coast agricultural region, smoke threatened the 
quality of grapes that were close to harvest, which would have resulted in 
massive losses for winemakers.54  In the Central Coast, the unusually high 
temperatures and smoke caused berries to excessively soften, which made 
them susceptible to vinegar flies and pests.55  Given this dire urgency to pick 
the crops, farmers continued their business operations as usual. 
In a committee hearing on agriculture, the president of the California 
Farm Bureau Federation shed light on the plights of small farmers and 
emphasized that they are hurting.56  Many farmers had everything from 
employee housing, to entire vineyards, harvests, and farm animals burn 
completely to the ground.  During the committee hearing, ranchers recounted 
horrifying stories of watching and hearing their cattle burn in agony, while 
farmers spoke of feeling a deep sense of helplessness watching their year 
long’s harvest and livelihood burn into nothing.57  All of the farmers who 
spoke at the hearing felt disheartened knowing that wildfires will continue to 
threaten their businesses and crops, and further worried that insurers will 
begin to limit or deny them coverage in the future.58 
Over the past several years, farmers have experienced profound business 
losses as a result of the wildfires, but losses vary greatly depending on the 
type of crops.59  For example, the Camp Fire, which burned through Northern 
California in November 2018, burned about 150,000 acres of mountain and 
foothill pasture and grazeland.60  Agricultural economic losses are estimated 
at only about $5 million dollars because most of that pasture recovered its 
productivity over the coming months.61  This stands in stark opposition to the 
Thomas Fire in Ventura and Santa Barbara counties in December 2017.  That 
fire destroyed much less in terms of acreage than the Camp Fire, but it 
destroyed very high-value crops, including avocados and citrus.  The total 
losses for that fire are estimated at $70 million.62 
As of the time of this writing, experts are unsure of the economic 
ramifications of the 2019 and 2020 wildfire seasons because “the aggregate 
assessments for those recent fires remains incomplete,” but they hypothesize 
 
53. Tim Hearden, Heat, wildfires threaten California crops, WESTERN FARM PRESS (Aug. 19, 
2020), https://www.farmprogress.com/disaster/heat-wildfires-threaten-california-crops. 
54. Id. 
55. Id.   
56. See CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY MEDIA ARCHIVES, supra note 10, at 1:00:45 (statement of 
President of California Farm Bureau Federation Jamie Johansen). 
57. See CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY MEDIA ARCHIVES, supra note 10, at 1:14:55, 1:20:45 (statement 
of hemp farmer Eddie Campos and cattle rancher Dr. Dave Daley). 
58. Id. 
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that the agricultural losses likely exceed those from 2017 and 2018.63  The 
2020 wildfires occurred as early as August, which is prime harvest season, 
so many more crops were lost.  The fires in 2020 were also more far-reaching 
in terms of geography and crops affected, so this also likely translates to a 
greater financial loss.64  This bleak economic reality has been sobering for 
farmers, so when news of wildfires surfaces, they mobilize their workers to 
pick and save as much as they can.65 
III. CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO THE WILDFIRE 
CRISIS 
A. Organizing Efforts Behind the Emergency Mandate 
After the 2017 and 2018 wildfire seasons, it became clear that 
farmworkers were especially vulnerable and that legislative measures to 
ensure their physical wellbeing were necessary.  Three advocacy 
organizations, Worksafe, the California Labor Foundation, and the California 
Rural Legal Assistance Foundation (CRLA), were instrumental in petitioning 
the State’s Department of Industrial Relations to pass an emergency 
regulation protecting people who performed outdoor work—particularly 
those in construction, landscaping, and farming—from the harmful effects of 
smoke inhalation.66  Attorney Nicole Marquez, then working with Worksafe, 
said that the multi-organization effort arose after hearing countless stories of 
seasonal laborers in Sonoma County who were deeply affected by the 
wildfire smoke.67  Those laborers were not being provided with personal 
protective equipment, there were no structural changes made to the workday 
to allow for more breaks, and farmworkers were being exposed to extremely 
toxic particulate matter.68  Moreover, Ms. Marquez points out that the 
organizers of the wildfire mask mandate realized that the current regulatory 
standards were not up to par and that additional protections were merited, 
which set them on their quest to petition the State.69 
B. Passage of the Temporary Emergency Mandate 
On July 18, 2019, the California Department of Industrial Relations, 
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the California Code of Regulations to address the wildfire crisis.70  The 
Department cited many reasons for the emergency regulation: fires 
increasing in frequency, size, and intensity; the risks associated with PM2.5 
inhalation; and the need to clarify how employers conducting their businesses 
outdoors should protect their employees from the harmful effects of smoke.71  
The “Protection from Wildfire Smoke” emergency rule was adopted on July 
18, 2019 and was initially set to expire on January 24, 2020.72  However, the 
rule’s expiration deadline has been extended multiple times through 
Executive Orders N-40-20 and N-66-20.73 
Cal. Code of Reg. §5141.1 applies to most outdoor workplaces where 
the AQI for PM2.5 is 151 or higher, and where the employer should 
reasonably anticipate that employees may be exposed to wildfire smoke.74  
Moreover, the mandate states that it is the responsibility of the employer to 
determine employee exposure to PM2.5 by checking the AQI forecast at the 
beginning of each shift and periodically thereafter.  When the AQI is between 
151 and 500, the employer shall provide a sufficient number of N95 
respirators to employees for voluntary use and encourage them to use the 
equipment.  When the AQI is above 500, which translates to “hazardous air 
quality,” respirators are absolutely required.  Lastly, respirators “shall be 
cleaned or replaced as appropriate, stored, and maintained, so that they do 
not present a health hazard to the user.”75 
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE EMERGENCY MANDATE 
A. The Mandate is Unenforceable   
The mandate is simple enough, but employers often disregarded it.  Part 
of the reason for this is that the mandate relies on the employer’s good faith 
efforts.  For example, the emergency mandate states that it is the 
responsibility of the employer to check the AQI at the beginning of the 
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workday or shift, and thereafter as necessary.76  Checking the air quality on 
a daily basis is important because depending on the AQI, certain employer 
responsibilities are triggered.  However, there was no accountability 
mechanism set in place to ensure compliance on the part of employers, 
making the mandate easy to disregard. 
Moreover, the mandate is problematic because Cal OSHA does not have 
the capacity to conduct field inspections to ensure complaince.77  According 
to Doug Parker, Chief at Cal OSHA, OSHA has about “200 field enforcement 
officers to inspect around 200,000 workplaces in California that are 
potentially impacted by wildfire smoke.”78  Simply put, the agency does not 
have the people power nor the capacity to do a site visit, measure the air 
quality, and ensure that every employer is in compliance.79  In light of these 
limitations, the California Department of Industrial Relations also set up an 
anonymous hotline where workers could report unsafe working conditions.80  
The hotline was seldom used by farmworkers, even when they witnessed 
violations of the emergency mandate, because they feared that the calls would 
be traced back to them.81  Fear of losing their livelihoods and/or of being 
deported due to immigration status, in addition to a general lack of awareness 
of the hotline’s existence in the first place, were the major reasons that the 
hotline went unused.82 
Critics of the mandate also argue that OSHA’s messaging is 
conflicting.83  On the one hand, air districts urged people to stay indoors to 
avoid toxic smoke inhalation, avoid strenuous work or outdoor exercise, and 
to plan daily activities according to smoke conditions.84  These public health 
advisories failed to consider the daily lived experiences of farmworkers 
whose entire work is centered in an outdoor field, and who cannot avoid 
being outdoors.  The emergency mandate offers contradictory advice, telling 
workers that “they can go out into the field and exert themselves, as long as 
they have a mask in their possession.”85  This dissonance underscores the fact 
that farmworkers’ continued labor is valued as essential, yet their health and 
wellbeing are not. 
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B. Farmers Believe that the Mandate is too Restrictive 
Farmers’ response to the regulation has also been mostly negative.  At 
a committee hearing on agriculture at the State capitol in November 2020, 
Jamie Johansen, the President of the California Farm Bureau Federation, 
which represents the interests of farmers and ranchers throughout California, 
called for more flexibility from OSHA and argued that the mandate was 
difficult for employers to comply with.86  Mr. Johansen noted that in light of 
the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic, personal protective equipment, 
such as N95 masks, was virtually impossible to come across.87  The State 
recognized that the global pandemic was making N95 masks hard to find, so 
the Office of Emergency Services shipped more than three million masks to 
county agricultural commissioners in 35 counties for distribution to 
farmworkers.88  However, Mr. Johansen argued, despite this effort mask 
access was still not feasible.89  He further argued that given mask 
unavailability, the mandate “prevented even the most usual of activities, such 
as harvesting, planting or cultivation, or application of pesticides.”90  Mr. 
Johansen ended his testimony by urging the State to adopt a less restrictive 
approach that would give employers more flexibility, or at the very least, 
have the county agricultural commissioners stockpile N95 masks to ensure 
that there would not be another shortage in the future.91 
Employers are also wary of the mandate because they fear liability.  The 
California Association of Winegrape Growers website, for example, urges 
growers to stockpile N95 masks because “wildfires in California have 
tragically become routine” and with the mandate still in effect, it is 
employers’ responsibility to protect workers.92  The website reiterates the 
major responsibilities for employers set out in the emergency regulation and 
how to comply with them.93  The website also reminds growers that the use 
of the mask is entirely voluntary if the AQI is below 500.94  The Association 
 
86. See CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY MEDIA ARCHIVES, supra note 10, at 1:06:11 (statement of 
President of California Farm Bureau Federation Jamie Johansen). 
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adds that, “for some workers, the N95 mask is uncomfortable or makes it 
difficult to breathe, so some workers may choose not to wear one…  
Consequently, growers are required to provide full information to the worker 
and some growers may want to ask workers sign a waiver when using the 
mask voluntarily.”95  The website includes a link, only available to its 
members, of sample waiver forms that growers may implement in their 
companies, which further cements the notion that employers dislike the 
mandate because they fear liability.96 
C. The Mandate Did Very Little to Actually Protect 
Farmworkers 
In theory, the emergency rule aims to protect outdoor workers such as 
farmworkers from toxic smoke inhalation and attempts to clarify employer 
responsibilities.  But in practice, the rule has done very little to protect 
farmworkers.  Many farmworkers never received the proper N95 respirators, 
there was pushback from farmers who believed this mandate was too 
restrictive, and there were no enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that 
the mandate was being followed. 
According to the United Farm Workers Union, “enforcement of the 
regulation is problematic” because of employer noncompliance.97  In a 
statewide poll that the union conducted in August 2020 to get a better 
understanding of how the mask mandate was going, they found that of the 
350 workers who responded, many from the Central Valley, 84% reported 
that they had not received a mask.98  Though employers did not provide the 
proper protective masks, data shows that farmworkers continued working 
during the wildfires, making it very likely that they labored in toxic air and 
were exposed to toxic particulates.  Mr. Amezquita, manager at the Salinas 
farmworkers co-op, noted that of the residents who continued working, only 
the ones who worked with the larger employers were provided masks.  He 
added that this was perhaps due to the fact that only the larger employers had 
the means to purchase the masks or acquire them through county 
partnerships.  Those who worked for smaller farmers often received cheaper 
surgical masks, which were not in compliance with the state’s mandate and 
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Pictures of farmworkers laboring under orange, ash-filled skies without 
N95 masks circulated on social media sites and newspapers, prompting 
grassroots organizations to mobilize and secure masks for workers.  For 
example, organizations around the Bay Area, including La Santa Torta, a 
Mexican food truck located in Oakland, mobilized community support 
through social media platforms.100  La Santa Torta collected donated supplies 
such as N95 respirators, grocery store gift cards, and hygiene products at 
various pre-announced locations in the Bay Area before driving them down 
to the Central Valley.101 
D. Was the Mandate Merely Symbolic? 
Analyzing all of the mandate’s shortcomings makes one wonder if its 
passage was merely symbolic, given that it includes no real way of being 
enforced.  In a newspaper interview, Doug Parker, the Chief of Cal OSHA, 
mentioned that he wishes the State had a stronger regulatory framework in 
place with the appropriate enforcement tools to better protect farmworkers, 
but that the current mandate was truly “a balancing of interests” and the end 
result of the regulatory process. 102  Mr. Parker is right.  A permanent 
regulatory framework that perfectly captures the interests of farmworkers, 
advocates, and farmers is difficult to attain.  The following section includes 
some alternatives to the problem and anticipated pushback. 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Despite the mandate’s limitations, it should be made permanent because 
it is a step in the right direction, and some protections are better than no 
protections.  However, alternative ways of looking at the issue are merited. I 
believe that implementing hazard pay for farmworkers, allowing workers to 
take time off during the wildfires, encouraging farmers to stockpile N95 
masks for future use, having advocacy organizations play a more active role 
in educating farmworkers about their rights, and adopting new value systems 
in agribusiness are all creative ways of addressing the problem.  These 
solutions are not intended to be mutually exclusive, and will likely be met 
with resistance because of the many competing interests at play. 
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A. The Emergency Regulation Should be Made Permanent 
The emergency mandate was originally passed on July 18, 2019, and 
has been extended twice as of the time of this writing, but it has not yet been 
made permanent.103  Despite its shortcomings, the mandate should be made 
permanent because it was a progressive move by our lawmakers.  The 
mandate and surrounding dialogue also forced Californians and advocates on 
both sides of the issue to confront the harsh realities of the wildfire crisis we 
are facing and its impacts on farmers, farmworkers, and the food that we 
consume.  The mandate should also be made permanent because wildfires 
will most certainly continue to threaten our communities.  Some experts 
suggest that fires will continue to intensify unless we first combat the effects 
of climate change.104  Others are more optimistic about our future and believe 
that we can coexist with wildfires, as long as we invest in forest health 
projects, green belts, and identifying hazard areas.105  These are long-term 
solutions, but farmworkers need immediate protections, which the mandate 
can provide. 
Critics on both sides of the debate will likely be wary of the mandate if 
it is permanently adopted.  Farmers will likely say that it is too restrictive, 
given that this is their current stance.106  Advocates who want more 
protections for farmworkers will say the opposite, that the mandate is only 
symbolic because it has no real way of being enforced.  However, I think that 
some, though not all, of the failures of the mandate can be mitigated now that 
we have more insight into what went wrong.  For example, we know that 
many farmworkers never received an N95 respirator because farmers were 
unable to secure them due to a national mask shortage occasioned by 
COVID-19.  But now that more people are vaccinated and the State has the 
lowest infection rate in the nation,107 the mask shortage might be a non-issue 
in the future, as further discussed below.  Another source of criticism 
regarding the mandate stems from its unenforceability, but perhaps this can 
be mitigated by increased presence of advocacy organizations, who 
encourage farmworkers to report unsafe working conditions.108 
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B. Employers Should be Proactive About Securing N95 Masks 
for Future Use 
In 2020, the COVID-19 global pandemic resulted in an N95 mask 
scarcity.  Many employers cited this as a major reason for their inability to 
procure protective equipment for their workers and comply with the State’s 
mandate.109  To avoid this situation in the future, employers should be 
proactive and purchase compliant masks to have them on hand for when they 
are needed.  Depending on the number of workers, the employer should 
anticipate buying in bulk as there is no telling how long each season’s 
wildfires will last.  Also, employers should stock up anyway, since they need 
to periodically provide clean masks to their employees to be in compliance 
with the mandate. 
Out of all of my policy recommendations, this is the most feasible 
because now that nearly two years have passed since the initial start of the 
COVID pandemic, a pack of thirty N95 masks retails for about $27, or $0.90 
per mask.110  There will likely be criticisms of this recommendation because 
it reinforces the current emergency mandate, which has already been 
criticized as providing the most basic of protections for farmworkers.  It 
further assumes that the farmworkers will be wearing the masks to begin 
with.  In my interview with Mr. Amezquita, he said that residents mentioned 
being unable to work effectively with their masks on.  Working in the fields 
is already strenuous enough, but working with a very thick, multi-layer mask 
makes breathing very difficult, especially in hot and dry conditions, so some 
farmworkers opted not to wear them.111 
C. Implementation of Hazard Pay on a Local Level 
Implementing local ordinances that require employers to pay temporary 
additional compensation to farmworkers laboring under hazardous air 
conditions is another potential solution.  Hazard pay is defined as “additional 
pay for performing hazardous duties or work, involving physical hardship.  
Work duty that causes extreme physical discomfort and distress which is not 
adequately alleviated by protective devices is deemed to impose a physical 
hardship.”112  Under this definition, farmworkers should be entitled to 
additional pay for their work because they labor in the fields during record 
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toxic air quality, which causes extreme physical discomfort that is not 
adequately alleviated by protective devices such as masks. 
Palm Springs, located in California’s Coachella Valley, recently 
implemented a hazard pay ordinance that serves as an interesting case study.  
The Coachella City Council unanimously approved of an emergency “hero 
pay” ordinance for essential workers, including hazard pay benefits to 
farmworkers.113  The ordinance requires agricultural operations that employ 
300 or more workers nationally, and more than five employees in the city, to 
pay their workers an additional $4 per hour for at least 120 days.114  There is 
a lot that can be learned from this “hero pay” ordinance because it was 
implemented at the local level, circumventing many bureaucratic hurdles, 
and does a good job of balancing interests.  This initiative takes into account 
the fact that small farmers have been particularly devastated by the wildfires 
by requiring only farmers who employ more than five people in the city to 
pay the additional rate.  The ordinance is also temporary, which takes into 
account the fact that farmers are hurting financially and raises wages for only 
short periods of time. 
However, a hazard pay policy would likely be met with resistance by 
farmers, and perhaps even advocates.  Small farmers and growers will argue 
that instituting a hazard pay ordinance will hurt their businesses in a time 
where they are struggling financially as a result of the wildfires and COVID-
19.  A few days after the hero pay ordinance was passed in Palm Springs, 
several groups sued the city in federal court, arguing that “is not prudent to 
place an additional burden on an industry that is struggling under the weight 
of the pandemic.”115  Other city councils around California that pass similar 
ordinances would likely face legal backlash as well.  Advocates for 
farmworkers also may be hesitant about hazard pay provisions because an 
extra couple of dollars per hour will not protect farmworkers from inhaling 
toxic particles.  Increased hourly pay can also have the negative effect of 
incentivizing employers to reduce hours for their workers, which would 
cause farmworkers to suffer financially. 
Despite the anticipated litigation and challenges from farmers and 
farmworkers, I think that the hazard pay ordinance should be implemented 
as a policy solution.  Paying farmworkers more during the wildfire months, 
which typically only occur during the summer and early fall, is reasonable 
because it would not unduly burden employers.  Adopting the ordinance at 
the local level would also remove bureaucratic hurdles that might be 
encountered at the state level.  Of course, the downside to this is that the 
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hazard pay provision would only be available to farmworkers in some 
counties, rather than uniformly throughout the state.  Lastly, adoption of a 
hazard pay provision will signal to the farmworkers that both their work and 
health is valued. 
D. Implementing a “Fire Day” Model Parallel to the “Snow Day” 
Model   
Given that wildfires will likely be a sigificant part of California’s 
foreseeable future, it is advisable that the State create a more permanent 
solution by looking at what other states that face inclement weather 
conditions are doing to achieve a balance of interests between workers and 
employers.  Looking to states where snow poses significant seasonal 
challenges such as icy roads, poor visibility, unavailability of public 
transportation, and power outages can be a good start.  Under the Fair Labor 
Standard Act’s (FLSA) working time provisions, when employers are forced 
to close their offices due to inclement weather conditions, exempt 
employees’ pay “cannot be docked.”116  On the other hand, when the office 
is open but employees cannot make it for whatever reason, they are 
considered absent for personal reasons under the FLSA, and the employee 
does not have to be paid.  When the office is closed for more than a week, 
exempt employees do not need to be paid.117 
The adoption of a similar model in California that borrows language 
from the FLSA’s working time provisions, but that includes some 
amendments, is a progressive way of protecting farmworkers.  First, the fact 
that farmworkers are excluded from the FLSA’s overtime provisions118 
should not discourage legislators from looking to the FLSA for guidance.  In 
practice, the “fire day” model would more or less function as follows: if a 
farmer is forced to close down their business operations due to wildfires, they 
would be required to pay their employees, so as to not penalize them for the 
bad weather.  However, if the farmer keeps their operations open, and the 
farmworkers simply cannot come in, then the farmer would not be obligated 
to pay.  In this way, farmers would only need to pay their workers when the 
wildfires make work impossible, and not simply when the farmworkers 
choose not to come in to work.  As to additional amendments, an anti-
retaliation component to the “fire day” model is crucial to ensure that 
farmworkers would not be the subject of an adverse employment action for 
choosing to not go to work. 
The feasibility of implementing such a model in California is low, and 
would likely prompt a lot of pushback from farmers.  Given the financial 
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losses that some farmers have already experienced, they might resist a model 
that shifts the financial responsibility onto them when they are forced to close 
their operations, as opposed to having the State pick up that responsibility in 
the form of unemployment insurance.  To get around this issue, experts and 
legislators can collaborate on a financing mechanism that takes these issues 
into account and splits the costs between farmers and the government.  
Alternatively, legislators can reach a different compromise with farmers: one 
in which the farmers would only be required to compensate farmworkers for 
one week.  In this way, farmers would not be so financially drained if they 
were forced to close down their business due to the wildfires. 
Moreover, farmers and farmworker advocates might oppose adopting a 
“fire day” model on grounds that it is too restrictive and/or ambiguous as to 
the conditions that would force an employer to close down their operations, 
given that this would then trigger the employer’s responsibility to pay its 
employees.  The FLSA is of little help here because it does not specify the 
conditions under which employers may choose to close down their offices 
due to inclement weather.  California can opt for a similar approach and leave 
office closures to the employer’s discretion, but this risks employers keeping 
their operations open, even when it is unsafe, just to avoid paying workers.  
On the other hand, the State could require that operations cease when the AQI 
reaches a certain threshold.  However, this might create the same 
unenforceability issues as the emergency mandate faced, given that only 
about 200 OSHA field agents are available to inspect more than 200,000 
places across the State.119 
Farmworkers might also be critical of this model because should they 
choose to stay home during the wildfires when their employer keeps their 
operations open, they will lose pay.  Even if farmworkers are given the option 
to stay home during the wildfires, which would be better for their health, they 
might refuse to do so if it compromises their pay.  As previously noted, 
farmworkers have a strong work ethic and are motivated by making ends 
meet.  In a statewide poll conducted by the UFW, the workers that responded 
seemed less worried about the long-term health effects of the fires, and 
moreso concerned with “trying to figure out next week.”120 
All in all, the “fire day” model presents many challenges, and achieving 
a perfect balance of interests is simply not feasible.  Nonetheless, it presents 
the State with an opportunity to learn from states that also deal with inclement 
weather conditions to see what frameworks were successful for them, and 
whether those frameworks can be replicated here. 
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E. Advocacy Organizations Will Need to Maintain a Strong 
Presence 
Advocacy organizations, such as the UFW, have a long history of 
mobilization in California and have been instrumental in organizing 
farmworkers and teaching them the tools to be their own advocates.121  
Wildfires are just the latest in a string of injustices affecting farmworkers 
over decades, and advocacy organizations need to increase their presence.  
Advocacy organizations can inform farmworkers about their rights to labor 
in safe conditions, the process for reporting and filing grievances against their 
employers through the anonymous hotline, and other basic workplace rights 
through trainings and educational outreach.  During unprecedented times like 
these, with compounding effects of the climate crisis and a lingering global 
pandemic, advocacy organizations can act as liaisons between farmworkers 
and the State. 
It is important to note that organizing “know your rights” trainings, and 
other educational seminars are challenging endeavors.  In an amici brief 
(unrelated to the current wildfire crisis) advocating for union organizers to be 
afforded a limited right to access private property on which agricultural 
employees are working, CRLA argued that “farmworkers remain 
inaccessible outside of the workplace.”122  This is attributed to the fact that 
farmworkers are often unreachable by phone because of the unavailability of 
cell phones and social media, they are inaccessible where they live because 
they are oftentimes unhoused or live in temporary homes, and sometimes, 
they simply do not want to talk to advocates because they are undocumented 
or fear that they will lose their jobs.123  Thus, farmworkers would likely only 
be available for these educational trainings while they’re at work, but 
advocates might encounter hostility on part of the employer.  To overcome 
this hurdle, advocates would need to get very creative about finding ways to 
effectively communicate with farmworkers.  One idea might be to prerecord 
“know your rights” trainings and then circulate the links among farmworkers, 
which would allow them to view the training at a convenient time for them.  
Alternatively, organizations can print pamphlets and make them available at 
housing co-ops and public spaces such as community centers, churches, and 
grocery stores which are frequented by farmworkers.   
 
121. UFW History, UNITED FARM WORKERS, https://ufw.org/research/history/ufw-history/ 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2021). 
122. See Brief, supra note 25, at 9. 
123. Id. 
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F. Adopting New Value Systems in Agribusiness 
Oftentimes “agribusinesses prioritizes profit over human life,” so 
adopting new value systems in agribusiness is imperative.124  The aim of this 
alternative approach is not to vilify farmers, as they too have faced so much 
adversity and loss surrounding wildfire seasons since 2017.  However, the 
discourse cannot simply focus on economic losses.  Agribusiness leaders 
must adopt new attitudes that place farmworkers at the center of our food 
production model.  Making structural changes to the workday, such as 
enabling workers to take more breaks during the day, to seek shelter inside 
of their cars or carpool vans, and to have the option of calling out sick when 
the air is toxic without fear of losing their job, would be great measures to 
start.   
Farmworker advocates might argue that these structural changes are too 
slow and do not recognize the urgency of the situation.  This is a valid point. 
Changing industry standards is a slow process, but advocacy is a very 
powerful tool that can propel these changes.  Pamphlets, such as the one on 
La Cooperativa Campesina, which informs farmworkers of their right to safe 
drinking water, fifteen-minute shade breaks, well-maintained toilet facilities, 
and handwashing stations are powerful reminders that major shifts in 
agribusiness and new attitudes that recognize the dignity of our farmworkers 
are indeed possible through advocacy.125 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the wildfires in recent years have been the worst-ever 
recorded in the state’s modern history in terms of sheer loss and 
destruction,126 and they are expected to worsen in the future due to climate 
change.  This crisis—combined with the effects of a global pandemic—
reminds us that now, more than ever before, farmworkers desperately need 
to be protected from working under hazardous conditions that place their 
health and lives at risk.  The State responded by passing an emergency 
mandate that was a step in the right direction and should be made permanent, 
despite its problems.  However, alternative ways of approaching the situation 
are needed in addition to the mandate.  The solutions discussed in this 
investigation may seem impossible or slow, but advocates are hopeful that if 
 
124. See Marquez Interview, supra note 51. 
125. Conozca sus derechos en el lugar de trabajo, LA COOPERATIVA CAMPESINA DE 
CALIFORNIA, http://www.lacooperativa.org/farm-workers-know-your-rights-in-the-workplace/ 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2021). 
126. See CAL. ST. ASSEMBLY MEDIA ARCHIVES, supra note 10, at 34:24 (statement of CAL 
FIRE Chief Acting Deputy Director for Communications Nick Shuler). 
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these changes in agribusiness are going to be feasible, “they are going to be 
feasible in California.”127 
  
 
127. See Marquez Interview, supra note 51. 
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